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ABSTRACT: Members of Parliament may make use of argumentation from examples to justify policies
and legislation. In this contribution I concentrate on how argumentation from example may be used to
manoeuvre strategically in plenary legislative debates in the European parliament. As a framework for the
analysis of the strategic use of examples in the institutional setting of the European parliament, I shall make
use of van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (1999, 2002) concept of strategic manoeuvring.
KEYWORDS: argument from example, hasty generalization, parliamentary legislative debate, strategic
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1. INTRODUCTION
Examples or exemplary cases may perform an important role in legislative debates in the
European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament can make use of examples,
not only to elucidate or to illustrate proposed legislation, but also to justify legislation.
Argumentation from example may be found in plenary legislative debates in which the
need for legislation is under discussion. In these debates, it should become clear that there
is an economical, a legal or a social problem of sufficient seriousness as to require
legislation.
Some of the rhetorical advantages of using examples are that they may
substantiate subjects that might otherwise be too abstract, render difficult subjects more
accessible and, moreover, may arouse attention, personalize a topic or humanize the
discourse. Although the use of examples may be effective in achieving rhetorical gains,
when used argumentatively they may be easily criticized for constituting the fallacy of a
hasty generalization. This type of criticism can be illustrated by a debate in the Dutch
parliament on a proposal for legislation on stalking. In order to argue that there was a
serious need for legislation on stalking, the initiators of the bill brought forward that the
current legal answer to stalking, a court injunction, offers insufficient protection to the
victims of stalking. The initiators justified their standpoint by referring to a case which
they called ‘the classical example of stalking.’ In this particular case, the offender could
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not in any way be induced to end his stalking activities. Those opposing the proposal
qualified the argumentation of the initiators explicitly as a fallacy of hasty generalization:
‘too easily, a single case is generalized to a universal rule’ (Plug, 2007). Members of
Parliament may be expected to try to avoid this criticism and therefore, in terms of van
Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999), manoeuvre strategically when putting forward
argumentation from example.
In this contribution I will concentrate on how argumentation from example may
be used to manoeuvre strategically in plenary legislative debates in the European
parliament. 1 I will first discuss some of the features of this particular type of
argumentative discourse. Then I will assess how these features may provide techniques to
manoeuvre strategically when bringing forward argumentation from example. For the
analysis of the argumentation, I will make use of the pragma-dialectical argumentation
theory as developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) as well as of van Eemeren
and Houtlosser’s (1999, 2006) concept of strategic manoeuvring.
2. THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL MODEL OF CRITICAL DISCUSSION AND
LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, as developed by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1984, 1992), political argumentative practices, such as legislative debates,
may be considered as empirical approximations of a critical discussion that have to meet
certain standards of rationality. 2 Participants in these practices are looked upon as rational
decision-makers. When justifying their decisions they have to overcome rational criticism
on their points of view.
Pragma-dialectics offers a general theoretical instrument, the model of ‘critical
discussion,’ for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discussions. The model
specifies the resolution process, the stages that can be distinguished analytically in this
process and the types of speech acts that are instrumental in resolving a difference of
opinion.
In the extended version of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, van
Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999) introduced the theoretical concept of strategic
manoeuvring. This concept is based on the idea that arguers in argumentative discourse
make an effort to balance rhetorical effectiveness and dialectical standards of
reasonableness and enables us to include a rhetorical dimension in the analysis and
evaluation of argumentative discourse. If, however, argumentative moves violate a rule
for critical discussion, strategic manoeuvring derails and a fallacy is committed.
Strategic manoeuvring manifests itself in argumentative discourse in the choices
participants make from the ‘topical potential’ available at a certain stage in the debate, in
‘audience-directed framing’ of the argumentative moves, and in the use of ‘presentational
devices.’
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A more extensive article, based on this contribution will be published in Controversia.
This perspective on the legislative process is in line with MacCormick (2005, 295). He (being a legal
theorist as well as a Member of the European Parliament) observes that: “in the European Parliament,
legislative processes do have a rational and discursive quality, though falling well short of perfect
rationality.”
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In order to include insights in strategic manoeuvring in a dialectical analysis and
evaluation of argumentative discourse, it is, according to van Eemeren and Houtlosser
(2005, 2006), necessary to take account of the specific activity type we are dealing with.
An activity type, such as a plenary legislative debate in the European Parliament, should
be considered as an empirical category that can be distinguished by ‘extrinsic’
observations of communicative practice in a specific political domain of discourse. The
characteristics of the activity type and the preconditions that are partly codified, are
instrumental in shaping the communicative practice concerned. The way in which these
characteristics of a plenary legislative debate may affect strategic manoeuvring comes to
the fore if the activity type is confronted with the model of critical discussion.
3. PLENARY DEBATES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The way in which plenary debates in the European Parliament (Plenary Sessions or the
Plenary) take place, is to a large extent laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the
European Parliament. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) must act in
accordance with these rules of conduct.
The structuring of the debates always involves the allocation of speaking time.
Specific speaking time is reserved for the Commission and the Council, but several
categories of MEPs also have reserved speaking time. These include Reporters
(Rapporteurs) and draftsmen of opinions and authors of motions for resolution. The
largest proportion of speaking time is allocated to the political groups of the European
Parliament. Each political group receives speaking time roughly in proportion to its
number of seats.
A plenary debate in the European Parliament on legislative and non-legislative
reports, normally starts with an opening statement from the European Commission. This
statement is followed by the Rapporteur presenting the response of the relevant European
Parliament committee. If applicable, draftsmen of opinions from other committees may
speak after the Rapporteur. Then, the general debate follows with each political group
speaking on the issue under debate, starting with the largest group. Party groups decide
internally how to divide time among their Members of Parliament, with the time for
individual speeches being strictly limited. At the end of the debate, the Commission
replies to the speeches and indicates its position on proposed amendments to the
legislative proposal.
After a debate in which the Commission, the representatives of the political
groups and individual MEPs have expressed their views, a parliamentary report may be
put to the vote. In Plenary Session, the European Parliament normally takes decisions by
an absolute majority of votes cast. At the end of voting time, Members may request to
take the floor again to give an explanation of vote and to present their analysis and
explain their choice or that of their group.
3.1 Characteristics of plenary legislative debates in the European Parliament
In order to be able to analyse and evaluate the argumentation that is brought forward in
plenary debates in the European Parliament on proposals for legislation, it is necessary to
discuss how the legislative process in the European Parliament is organised and which
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propositions are discussed in the legislative debates that take place in the different stages
of the legislative process.
Although the European legislative process is in many respects similar to that in
the national contexts, there are some differences concerning, for instance, the role of
Parliament. In the national contexts the will of the nation is expressed in Parliament,
whereas in the European Parliament the legislative powers of the Parliament are shared.
Apart from the European Parliament, there are two other major European institutions
involved in the legislative process: the European Commission and the Council of the
European Union. In principle, the European Commission proposes new legislation. The
main forms of EU-laws are directives and regulations. Before the Commission proposes
legislation, they may issue working documents that include Green Papers (proposals in a
specific policy area) and White papers (proposals for Community action). Both are
generally used as a basis for public consultation before draft legislation is issued.
When the Commission puts forward a proposal for legislation, the proposal (draft
legislation) is presented to the European Parliament, where it is scrutinised by one of the
appropriate standing committees. A Member of the European Parliament from the
committee is appointed to be the rapporteur, or spokesman who prepares a draft report.
The standing committee discusses this report and decides whether to allow or disallow
any amendments. The report is then debated at the Plenary and the European Parliament
gives an opinion on the proposal which is agreed or rejected by an absolute majority of
votes.
If accepted, the ‘First reading’ is sent to the Council of Ministers, which can either
accept it, or review the amended text and in consultation with the Commission adopt a
further amended version of the legislative text. This version is then returned to the
European Parliament for a ‘Second reading,’ at which it may be adopted and become law.
If this version is not accepted by the Parliament, a Conciliation Committee tries to
formulate a mutually acceptable text and presents this final text to the European
Parliament for a ‘Third reading.’ This proposal can only be accepted or rejected.
When using the model of a critical discussion as a tool to reconstruct the
argumentative discourse that takes place in a plenary legislative debate (on the ‘First
reading’), the argumentative activity can be represented as follows (Van Eemeren and
Houtlosser, 2005). In the confrontation stage, the proposition that is subject to the
difference of opinion can be reconstructed as: ‘Legislative proposal P1 (including
amendments A1, An) is acceptable.’ The opening stage is characterised by the explicit
rules of the debate as formulated in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament,
implicit (verbal behaviour) rules (of politeness, for instance) and implicitly or explicitly
shared concessions between the (members of) political groups. In the argumentation
stage, members of the political groups and non-attached members present their
argumentation in favour or against the acceptance of the legislative proposal. In the
concluding stage, the outcome of the argumentative exchange is determined on a vote.
Preliminary to a plenary debate on whether or not a specific proposal for new
legislation (P1) is acceptable, it might be expected that there has already been a debate on
a proposition that should be considered as part of the legislative process as well. In such a
debate, the proposition that should, in principle, already have been decided upon is: ‘A
proposal on new legislation at EU level (P) is needed.’ This assumption would be in line
with the logic of the analytical ‘stock-issue model for academic debate (Hill and Leeman,
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1997) in which the stock issue of ill (or significance) should be discussed before the stock
issue of cure (or solvency). According to this model it would not be reasonable to discuss
a (detailed) proposal for legislation (P1) if the need for new legislation (P) has not been
established. The stock issue of ill focuses on the assessment of the scale and the
seriousness of the problem in order to determine whether it is serious enough to justify
the need for (new) legislation.
Scholars in the field of constitutional law and legal theory, such as Fuller (1964),
Atienza (2005), as well as Members of Parliament themselves (in reports on the quality of
legislation), too, emphasize the importance of the justification of the need for legislation
at EU level.
It is not standard procedure in the European Parliament to bring up for discussion
the need for new legislation (at EU level) at the Plenary. It seems that it is, more often
than not, taken for granted that the Commission has indeed decided on the need for new
legislation at EU level before a proposal for new legislation is presented before the
Parliament. In that case, implicit agreement on the need for legislation may be
reconstructed as part of the opening stage of a plenary legislative debate (on the First
Reading).
If, however, the subject is discussed at the Plenary, it usually is part of a debate on
proposals for more general policies as in, for instance, White and Green papers which
may in a later stage result in proposals for (draft) legislation. These discussions can
therefore be seen as the first, preliminary stage of the legislative process. A
reconstruction of the debate in this preliminary stage of the legislative process
corresponds with the reconstruction of the legislative debate on the ‘First reading.’
However, the proposition that is subject to the difference of opinion as presented in the
confrontation stage concerns the need for legislation, whereas the proposition in a later
stage of the legislative process concerns the acceptability of a legal proposal.
Argumentation from example can be brought forward in the argumentation stages
of both plenary legislative debates. However, this type of argumentation will most likely
be found in plenary legislative debates in which the need for legislation is discussed. In
these debates, it is, in principle, necessary to argue that there is a legal or social problem
of sufficient seriousness to introduce (new) legislation. In order to defend or criticise the
(sub)standpoint that there is a problem that provides enough reason to take action in the
form of a proposal for legislation, argumentation from example may be advanced.
4. ARGUMENTATION FROM EXAMPLE
If one of the participants in a plenary legislative debate brings forward argumentation
from example, an analysis of the argumentation scheme could determine the soundness of
the argumentation. An argument scheme is a conventionalised way of displaying a
relation between that which is stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in the
standpoint (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). An MEP who advances argumentation
in the form of an example aims to bring about a transfer of acceptance from the premises
to the standpoint.
The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, distinguishes three main types of
argumentation, each with its own argumentation scheme: argumentation by comparison,
causal argumentation and symptomatic argumentation. In argumentation that is based on
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a symptomatic relationship, the standpoint is defended by mentioning in the premise a
specific characteristic of what is mentioned in the standpoint and by presenting this
characteristic as a typical quality of what is mentioned in the standpoint. Argumentation
from example is interpreted as a subtype of the general scheme for symptomatic
argumentation. A description of this subtype is provided by Garssen (1997) and van
Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007, 155): ‘In argumentation from
example separate facts are represented as special cases of something general: on the basis
of specific perceptions a generalisation is made.’
4.1 EVALUATING ARGUMENTATION FROM EXAMPLE
An adequate evaluation of an argument depends on the argumentation scheme that has
been deployed. Each argumentation scheme requires different criteria of soundness. In
order to determine whether these criteria are met, pragma-dialectics formulated different
sets of critical questions that are relevant to the different schemes. In case of
argumentation from example there are two central questions in order to determine
whether the argumentation scheme has been applied correctly. The first question focuses
on the representativeness of an example and the second question concentrates on the
sufficiency of an example. Since the correct use of the argumentation scheme calls for
examples that meet these two criteria, both questions should be answered satisfactorily in
order to conclude that the example is indeed typical of the state of affairs as it is
formulated in the standpoint. If the requirements of the argumentation scheme are not met
because the examples are not representative or not sufficient, the fallacy of hasty
generalization (secundum quid) is committed. According to van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1992, 166) the fallacy of hasty generalization is generally regarded as an
unacceptable way of arriving to general conclusions on the basis of specific observations.
The trouble is that it is not always clear when a generalization is based on observations
that are insufficiently representative or do not meet quantitative standards.
The following fragment illustrates how argumentation from example may be
criticised on the grounds that the examples that are used to arrive at the conclusion are
not sufficient. In a debate on Liberty and security, the Committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs has proposed new rules and regulations. In order to justify the
need for measures at the European level to retain communication data, the Committee
presented two examples. The MEP, Mr Reul, presents his criticism as follows.
(1) Herbert Reul (PPE-DE ).—(DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, […] It is then that I—
we—will be open to the possibility of considering new instruments, but I have to tell you, Mr
Clarke, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, that every single measure needs to be shown to
be necessary. It gives me pause of thought that this House has spent a year asking for proof of
the need for these measures to retain communications data, and that it is only now that we are
being given specific examples of why they are needed; even so, that is not evidence, but
individual examples of cases in which it was of use. That annoys me; grateful though I am
that these examples were at least provided, I have to tell you that they are not enough. […]
(7 September 2005—Strasbourg, Liberty and security)

From this reaction to argumentation from example it becomes clear that the MEP, Mr
Reul, does not reject the use of the argumentation scheme per se. He is, however, of the
opinion that the argumentation scheme does not meet one of the correctness conditions.
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In his view the two examples are not sufficient, which means that the Committee is
implicitly accused of committing the fallacy of hasty generalization (secundum quid): two
examples of situations in which retaining communication data was successful, are not
sufficient to justify the need for new measures to retain communication data.
Both the question with respect to the sufficiency and the representativeness of
examples is of particular interest for legislative discussions. They are in keeping with the
important question whether a proposal for legislation could be criticised for being ad hoc
or occasional. It is, in principle, taken as a ground rule that new legislation and statutory
changes should not be based on incidents: the legislator should be blind to individual
observations or specific cases (Eijlander, 2004). The question is how an MEP could make
an effort to live up to these dialectical and legislative norms without giving up rhetorical
advantages when presenting argumentation from example; in other words, which
characteristics of the activity type could be instrumental to manoeuvre strategically with
argumentation from example.
5. TECHNIQUES FOR STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING USING ARGUMENTATION
FROM EXAMPLE
The possibilities MEPs may have to manoeuvre strategically when presenting
argumentation from example are determined by the characteristics of plenary legislative
debates in European Parliament. These characteristics may, however, be completed with
features and conventions of political argumentation and features of argumentation in
Parliamentary debates in general. Since plenary debates could be seen as a specific
subgenre of political argumentation and parliamentary discourse, characteristics of these
more general genres may be of influence on the course of the discourse as well. Zarefsky
(2008) formulates features that are characteristic of political argumentation, such as: no
temporal limits, no way to be sure that the argument is over, heterogeneous audiences.
These features are considered as institutional conventions that shape political
argumentation. Some of the relevant features correspond to the features of parliamentary
discourse that are listed by Ilie (2003). Taken together, these features may provide or
require techniques to manoeuvre strategically when staging argumentation from example.
Both the features and the techniques may be related, although not exclusively, to the three
aspects of strategic manoeuvring: ‘topical potential,’ ‘audience demand’ and
‘presentational devices.’ I will discuss some of the features and demonstrate what
techniques they may provide or require with respect to the different aspects of strategic
manoeuvring. The examples that are provided illustrate that MEPs do indeed apply these
techniques.
Topical potential
One of the features that may be applied to manoeuvre strategically in plenary legislative
debates is the multi-layered role of the Members of Parliament and the opportunity of
role shifting (Ilie 2003). This feature, in particular, may provide tactical opportunities
concerning the choice of topics within argumentation from example. Members of the
European Parliament may play different roles at the same time. A politician is, apart from
being Member of the European Parliament, a member of a national party, a citizen of a
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particular European country, etc. An MEP of the UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations)
Group, for instance, explicitly pointed at his multi-layered role when he stated: ‘speaking
as somebody who comes from the island of Ireland and who understands the effects and
impact of terrorism.’ From observations of the institutional interaction, it becomes clear
that MEPs may not only shift between roles in the institutional and the private spheres,
but also within the institutional sphere itself. There may, for example, be a shift between
the role as Member of Parliament and that as member of a committee.
The different roles an MEP may play at the same time, provides him with
‘sources’ in different spheres for choosing examples that may be used in the
argumentation. It also makes it possible to deploy complex argumentation that is
composed of arguments from different spheres. These multiple roles do not only
contribute to the increase of the quantity of potential arguments, they also make it
possible to choose from a wider range of potential arguments that attune to the topic that
is under discussion and the public.
In a debate on overweight and obesity in which legislation on labelling is one of
the issues, one of the MEPs, Mrs Buitenweg, uses a role shift when bringing forward
argumentation from example.
(2) Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group.—(NL) Mr President, today
we are discussing overweight and obesity and I think it is important […] not to talk too much
about diet and waste, but to talk mainly about the need to eat healthily.
A couple of months ago I was very shocked when my daughter, an extremely slim
daughter, came home and did not want to eat her second slice of bread because she would get
fat. She had heard a lot at school about how above all you must not be fat, but she was not
sufficiently aware of how you should eat healthily and what a normal helping is. A child of
eight does not really understand when you are too fat. Thus it is very important to talk mainly
about healthy eating and not about whether a person is too fat.
(24 September 2008—Brussels. White Paper on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related
health issues)

The MEP presents the experiences of her own daughter of eight, in order to justify the
standpoint that eight-year-olds find it hard to grasp the concept of ‘being to fat.’ In doing
so, she shifts from her role as Member of the European Parliament to her role as a parent.
The rhetorical advantages of the role shift from MEP to the role of a parent are that it
humanizes the debate, it appeals to the role many MEPs and other members of the
audience have and that it provides her with the authority of a ‘hands-on’ expert. This last
aspect may be seen as an attempt to prevent that the argumentation from example will be
criticized for being a hasty generalization.
Audience demand
An important feature of legislative debates that may affect the way in which politicians
make use of strategic manoeuvring when presenting argumentation from example is the
presence of a multiple, heterogeneous audience. This feature requires techniques
concerning the choices that could be made to adopt argumentation from example to
beliefs and commitments of the audience. According to van Eemeren (quoted in Walton
1998, p. 191) ‘the argumentation in parliamentary debates is not only directed toward the
other party, but through newspapers and television to a much broader audience. The
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audience might consist of political opponents, coalition partners and the public as a
whole.’ (cf. Ilie 2003 and Zarefsky 2008).
With respect to the audience to whom the argumentation in a legislative debate is
directed, a distinction should be made between the different debates that take place within
the legislative process. One may assume that the debate on the need for new legislation is
held by a different group of MEPs than the debate which addresses the proposition of a
concrete European law or regulation. In the first stage the argumentation may be directed
to a broad audience that consists of specialists and non-specialists in the field of lawmaking. In the second stage, after the majority of the MEPs have voted on the need for
legislation, the debate on the concrete formulation of the law is much more technical and
the argumentation may be expected to address specialists rather than non-specialists. In
the first stage in particular, in which an MEP has to adapt argumentation from example to
a broad audience, it may be difficult to provide arguments (examples) that are acceptable
to as many members of the audience as possible. Opportunities to ‘bridge’ these
audiences can be found in choosing examples that are related to current topics and that
may be taken as known.
Although Zarefsky (2008, p. 320) rightly observers that ‘an arguer will have a
difficult time attributing any specific commitment to the audience as a whole,’ it may be
profitable to make an attempt to choose examples which may be expected to be in line
with common starting points and which concur with shared knowledge and values. In
order to meet differences in common starting points and shared knowledge and values
one might consider bringing up complex argumentation in which different examples
adapt to distinctive groups within the audiences.
In the following example an MEP, Mrs Klamt, brings forward argumentation
from example twice. On the basis of the first she concludes that terrorism acquired an
unequivocally European dimension. The second is used to argue that perpetrators do not
pass through porous borders in order to carry out terrorist acts in Europe.
(3) Ewa Klamt (PPE-DE).—(DE) Mr President, Mr Clarke, Vice-President Frattini, ladies and
gentlemen, (…) The ‘9/11’ events in the United States gave terrorism a wholly new
dimension, and it acquired an unequivocally European one with the attacks in Madrid on 11
March and in London on 7 July. The conflict is no longer a merely national one; the Western
world faces a massive threat. What the atrocities in London showed was that the perpetrators
do not pass through porous borders in order to carry out terrorist acts in Europe.
(7 September 2005—Strasbourg, Liberty and security)

Here, the examples on which the argumentation (i.c. the generalizations) hinges are,
undeniably, part of the common knowledge of the audience. The fact that the examples
are ‘loaded’ and appeal to a shared feeling of horror and fear, may reduce the chance for
the examples to be criticized for being insufficiently representative or not numerous
enough.
Presentational devices
One of the characteristics of plenary legislative debates that is relevant with respect to
presentational devices, is that the time to contribute to the debate is limited, whereas in
political argumentation in general, as Zarefsky (2008, 318) points out, this is not
necessarily the case. As I already indicated in the outline of the legislative procedure in
9

H. JOSÉ PLUG
European Parliament, a political group may only decide on whether the allotted speaking
time is awarded to one representative of a party or divided among the members. In any
case, this means that every MEP has to utilize the allocated time in an effective and
productive manner; the speaker has to single out the most important (sub) standpoints and
arguments he or she wants to present and weigh them against the opportunity to come up
with counterarguments or objections to the argumentation of other MEPs.
In plenary legislative debates, not only the allocation of time is regulated, but also
the turn-taking structure. The MEPs, in principle, are allowed to have the floor just once
during a debate on a particular report. In the plenary debates in the European Parliament,
interpellations are, in principle, not allowed. In the Code of conduct (art. 141, section 4) it
is stated that a speaker may not be interrupted, except by the Chair. This means that the
proponent does not have the opportunity to ‘repair’ his contribution to the discussion in a
later stage of the debate; nor is it possible to dose his argumentation in the course of the
debate. There is no opportunity to respond to opponents’ argumentations after one has
had the floor.
These features prevent an MEP to present a list of examples in order to justify his
standpoint, although that would reduce his chance to be accused of committing the
fallacy of hasty generalization. According to Rendal (1992, p. 66) there are also other
reasons to limit the number of examples in argumentation from example. He states that:
‘precisely because the example is a “rhetorical induction” (Aristotle), and because
offering too many examples is likely to be counterproductive by boring or confusing the
audience, the choice of examples is a crucial consideration. If the situation or institutional
regulations are such that the examples cannot rely on quantity to make its case; it has to
rely on quality.’ The MEP may therefore try to emphasize the quality of his example in
the presentation of it. He may also try to suggest that, in principle, there are much more
examples, but that he won’t bring them forward because of his awareness of the rhetorical
disadvantages or the procedural (time) constraints. Several presentational devices may be
of help to express these considerations.
Linguistic markers, such as the adjectives ‘typical,’ ‘telling,’ ‘characteristic’ may
be used to qualify the example that is used in the argumentation and emphasize the
quality of the example. In example (5) the MEP, takes up the (sub)standpoint that there is
a worrying trend (in) stopping young European Muslims from going to state or officially
recognized schools in favor of Koranic schools. By qualifying the example as ‘blatant,’
the MEP suggests that he could have given more examples, but that he presents here the
most striking one.
(4) Antonio Tajani (PPE-DE).—(IT) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, (…) We must not
confuse Islam with terrorism, but we must condemn those who, in the name of extremism, try
to stop young European Muslims from going to state or officially recognised schools in favour
of Koranic schools. That is a worrying trend—there is a blatant example in Milan—for it
aims at preventing the integration of immigrants in Europe so as to create pockets of illegality.
(7 September 2005—Strasbourg, Liberty and security)

In the next fragment the argumentation from example is complex. The MEP, Mrs Klaß,
however, seems to anticipate that the given examples may nevertheless be considered
insufficient to justify the standpoint. By using the expression ‘but a few,’ the MEP makes
an attempt to prevent this criticism.
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(5)

Klaß (PPE-DE).—(DE) Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, […]
The consequences of alcohol abuse affect us all. They affect families and societies. Road
deaths caused by drunk drivers, loss of jobs and ultimately family break-ups are but a few
examples of the ravages of alcohol abuse.
(15 May 2001—Strasbourg, Consumption of alcohol by children and adolescents)

The MEP, Mr Lundgren, brings forward the standpoint that the EU’s politicians and
officials try to centralize political power. By introducing the example with ‘it is another,’
he suggests that many more examples could be given, but that it would be superfluous to
mention them because it is shared knowledge that there are.
(6) Nils Lundgren, on behalf of the IND/DEM Group.—(SV) Madam President, this report on the
role of sport in education deals in detail with the question of how Member States shall
organise the subject of physical education in school. It is another example of how the EU’s
politicians and officials go into any area and at any level of detail they choose in their zeal to
centralise political power here.
(12 November 2007—Strasbourg. The role of sport in education)

6. CONCLUSION
A plenary legislative debate in the European Parliament can be characterised as an
institutionalized activity type. A confrontation between this activity type and the model of
critical discussion brings to light the characteristics that may influence the strategic
manoeuvring that takes place in plenary legislative debates. One of the propositions that
may be under debate in this activity type is whether or not legislation at the level of EU is
needed. In order to justify the existence of a (social, legal or economical) problem that
needs legislation, one type of argumentation that may be brought forward is
argumentation from example. Although the use of examples may, in principle, be
effective in achieving rhetorical gains, when used argumentatively they may be easily
criticised for constituting the fallacy of a hasty generalization. MEPs may be expected to
try to avoid this criticism and therefore manoeuvre strategically when they put forward
argumentation from example. In this paper I have made an attempt to determine some of
the techniques that may be used to manoeuvre strategically and at least give the
impression of a wish to avoid derailments of strategic manoeuvring. The techniques that
are discussed are provided by the features of the activity type and they are related to the
different aspects of strategic manoeuvring.
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